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Abstract— While intelligence of autonomous vehicles (AVs)
has significantly advanced in recent years, accidents involving
AVs suggest that these autonomous systems lack gracefulness in
driving when interacting with human drivers. In the setting of
a two-player game, we propose model predictive control based
on social gracefulness, which is measured by the discrepancy
between the actions taken by the AV and those that could have
been taken in favor of the human driver. We define social
awareness as the ability of an agent to infer such favorable
actions based on knowledge about the other agent’s intent, and
further show that empathy, i.e., the ability to understand others’
intent by simultaneously inferring others’ understanding of
the agent’s self intent, is critical to successful intent inference.
Lastly, through an intersection case, we show that the proposed
gracefulness objective allows an AV to learn more sophisticated
behavior, such as passive-aggressive motions that gently force
the other agent to yield.
I. INTRODUCTION
While intelligence of autonomous vehicles (AVs) has sig-
nificantly advanced in recent years, accidents involving AVs
suggested that these autonomous systems lack gracefulness
in driving. In one incident, Waymo reported that its AV
(denoted by “M” hereafter) was stuck at an intersection
because human drivers (denoted by “H”) coming from the
other road never stopped fully while approaching the inter-
section, making M believe that H wanted the right of way
and causing it to stop indefinitely [1]. The first claim against
an AV manufacturer has been filed against General Motors
in 2018, following a collision between a Cruise Automation
2016 Chevrolet Bolt and a motorcyclist, who alleged that the
car swerved into his path without his agreement [2].
Both incidents can be attributed to M’s lack of under-
standing of H’s intent and thus its failure to predict H’s
future motion. In interactions that involve both agents as
decision makers, M’s inference of H’s intent depends on
not only observations from H, but also knowledge about
H’s understanding of M. In other words, M needs to be
empathetic in order to understand what leads to H’s behavior.
To elaborate, consider that an agent’s intent is defined as
parameters of its control objective. The interaction between
M and H from the perspective of M can be modeled as
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Fig. 1. An illustration of social awareness of an agent. By inferring H’s
intent, M infers how H will move, how M is expected to move, and what
movements of M will be in favor of H.
results from a series of games along time, with each new
game parameterized by M’s intent, and M’s current inference
of H’s intent. M chooses motion based on the perceived game
and its planning strategy (e.g., reactive or proactive planning,
see Sec. IV for definitions), and assumes that H follows the
same decision making process for motion planning, with its
own perception of the game and planning strategy. Under
this game-theoretic setting, the inference of H’s intent is in
conjunction with that of H’s inference of M’s intent, i.e.,
what H expects M to do, which is in general different from
M’s true intent. Enabling M’s awareness of the difference
between M’s and H’s perception of the interaction is what
makes M empathetic.
Building upon this, this paper further introduces a mo-
tion planning strategy that incorporates social gracefulness,
which is defined as the discrepancy between the actions taken
by M and those that could have been taken in favor of H.
Take the intersection case in Fig. 1 for example. When H
moves slowly, an empathetic M knows that he is expected
to take the right of way. A socially-aware M, in addition,
knows that himself driving slowly to allow H to pass would
do H a favor. Note that to acquire social awareness, M would
need to understand H’s intent, and thus be empathetic in the
first place. We will show that considering the gracefulness
objective in planning allows M to learn more sophisticated
behavior, such as passive aggressive motions that gently force
H to yield.
The technical approaches of the paper can be summarized
in two steps: In Sec. III, we formulate the intent inference
problem where the intents of both agents are jointly inferred,
based on the assumption that the both agents model each
other to adopt a baseline planning strategy where the agent
plans motions based on the set of Nash equilibria of the
game perceived by the others. In Sec. IV, we explore more
sophisticated planning strategies enabled by the inferred
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Fig. 2. Summary of the intent inference and motion planning algorithms of M. To perform intent inference, M needs to model H’s motion planning
hypothetically. The highlighted modeling elements include (1) the game-theoretic intent inference algorithm that enables empathy, (2) the incorporation of
inference uncertainty in motion planning, and (3) more sophisticated motion planning objectives enabled by intent inference.
intents, and evaluate how these strategies influence the actual
social gracefulness and social efficiency of an interaction
between H and M. Three driving strategies will be explored:
(1) A reactive M plans based on the inferred distribution
of future motions of H. (2) A proactive M exploits the
fact that H’s future motion are dependent on M’s. (3) A
socially-aware M is built upon the proactive model, with the
additional gracefulness loss. The proposed intent inference
and motion planning models are summarized in Fig. 2.
The intellectual contributions of this paper are two-fold:
First, we propose mechanistic intent inference and motion
planning algorithms for two-agent interactions. Our approach
is different from existing studies where the control policy or
objective of either M or H is learned offline through data.
The introduction of empathy was previously discussed in
Liu et al. [12]. This idea is extended to non-collaborative
scenarios with non-quadratic control objectives. Second, we
introduce the definition of social gracefulness as a perfor-
mance measure for human-machine interactions. The idea of
measuring risk through the difference between the driver’s
actions and what he is expected to do according to traffic
rules was introduced in [7]. We take a parallel approach by
defining the nominal actions as shaped by others’ intents
(i.e., tacit social norms), rather than by explicit traffic rules.
II. RELATED WORK
AV has been an active and fast developing research topic
in the past few years. Scenarios such as lane changing, lane
merging, and traffic intersections, where AVs closely interact
with human-driving vehicles, are widely investigated [11],
[21], [8]. Human drivers are often modeled as rational and
intelligent decision makers in these studies. Pentland and
Liu proposed a dynamic Markov models to recognize and
predict human driving actions [15]. Levine et al. adopted
an inverse reinforcement learning method to explore human
drivers’ reward functions based on human demonstration
recorded through a driving simulator [9]. Machine learning
is used to predict the lateral motions and braking actions of
human driver [19], [14], [17]. These data-driven approaches
require a large amount of data for model training. Wang et al.
discussed the appropriate amount of data to achieve sufficient
understanding of human driving behavior [18].
Based on proper human driver models, an essential ques-
tion remains as how to achieve safe and efficient human-
machine interactions. Nikolaidis et al. [13] proposed a mutual
adaptation algorithm where human’s willingness to adapt is
inferred and incorporated into the robot’s motion planning.
In a similar two-agent collaborative setting, Liu et al. [12]
proposed a “Blame-all strategy” for intent inference. Much
like this paper, “Blame-all” performs inference of others’
intents by taking into account others’ inference of the agent’s
intent, with the limited scope of quadratic control objec-
tives. For dynamically changing agent parameters (such as
intents), Foerster et al. [5] proposed Learning with Opponent-
Learning Awareness (LOLA), a method for agents to incor-
porate the anticipated learning of other agents during its own
adaptation (similar to [16] and the proactive vs. reactive case
of this paper). LOLA, however, had limited discussion on
scenarios where opponent parameters and parameter tuning
schemes need to be inferred in a higher level game (e.g.,
proactive vs. proactive as in this paper). Specific to AVs,
various game theoretic models have been constructed to
describe different interactions between human drivers and
AVs [20], [3]. In a setting of partially observable Markov
decision process, Li et al. introduced a “Level-k” reasoning
model to evolve the strategies that agents adopt in driving
interactions [10]. Nonetheless, their solution requires an
iterative search through reinforcement learning. In contrast,
mechanistic models (e.g., [12], [13] and this paper) are one-
shot and are more suitable for scenarios where agents are
required to learn and adapt in real time.
III. INTENT INFERENCE
This section introduces the motion planning game and
the inverse problem of intent inference. For simplicity, we
focus on an interaction between two agents, M and H. The
extension to multi-agent settings will be left as future work.
The inference by M is based on the assumptions that H uses
a baseline motion planning strategy (see Sec. III-B), and that
H believes that M uses the same strategy.
A. The motion planning game
Let si(t) and ui(t) be the state and action at time t, with
the subscript i ∈ {H,M} specifying the agent. We consider
deterministic state transition: s(t) = s(t − 1) + u(t − 1),
and define i’s planned motion at t as a sequence of actions
ξi(t) := [ui(t),ui(t + 1), · · · ,ui(t + T − 1)], where T is
a predefined finite time horizon. The dependency on t will
be omitted for brevity. The planning game is formulated as
follows: The instantaneous loss of agent i is
l(ξi, ξj , ci, si, sj) = lsafety(ξi, ξj , si, sj) + ciltask(ξi, si), (1)
where lsafety measures the safety loss, ltask the fulfillment of a
task, e.g., “lane changing” or “crossing the intersection” (see
Sec. V), and the intent parameter ci governs the behavior of
the vehicle. Note that lsafety involves the distance between
i and j, and thus requires ξi, ξj , si, and sj as inputs. The
dependency on si and sj will be omitted for brevity. The
payoff for i in the game is defined as the accumulative loss
f(ξi, ξj , ci) =
t+T−1∑
τ=t
l(ξi, ξj , ci) (2)
for ξi that satisfies gi(ξi) ≤ 0, which represents boundaries
on future states. For infeasible ξi, f = ∞. Each agent
chooses its motion from a finite candidate set Ξi. Under this
setting, the game is guaranteed to have at least one Nash
equilibrium (Theorem 23 in [6]).
Denote cˆj as i’s estimation of j’s intent (see Sec. III-C
for the inference of cˆj). The game at time t yields a Nash
equilibrium set Q(ci, cˆj , t) = {(ξ∗i , ξˆ∗j )}, where ξˆ∗j is i’s
estimation of j’s planned motion. Each element ofQ satisfies
ξ∗i = arg min
{ξi∈Ξi;gi(ξi)≤0}
f(ξi, ξˆ
∗
j , ci),
ξˆ∗j = arg min
{ξj∈Ξj ;gj(ξj)≤0}
f(ξj , ξ
∗
i , cˆj).
(3)
For example, at an intersection without a stop sign, either M
or H yielding to the other will satisfy Eq. (3) when both M
and H are non-aggressive (i.e., with small c). It is important
to note that for i to understand j, i needs to put himself
in the shoes of j and derive the equilibrium set from j’s
perspective. Since j does not know ci, a necessary correction
is to replace ci with c˜i, i.e., i’s estimation of j’s estimation
of i’s intent, and similarly, ξ∗i with ξ˜
∗
i .
B. The baseline driving strategy
Agent i is modeled to believe that j plans its motion at
t by sampling uniformly from Q(c˜i, cˆj , t), i.e., j’s motion
follows the probability mass function:
p(ξˆj ; c˜i, cˆj , t) ∝ |{ξˆj ; (ξ˜i, ξˆj) ∈ Q(c˜i, cˆj , t)}|,
where | · | is the cardinality of a set.
C. Inference of intent and motion
Eq. (4) formulates the inference problem where we esti-
mate the intents (c˜i and cˆj) and the planned motions (ξ˜∗i and
ξˆ∗j ) at time t based on the states and actions of i and j at t−1.
The idea is that the estimated intents should be such that j’s
planned motion at t − 1 with the highest probability mass
(denoted by ξˆ†j (t − 1)) should have its first action (denoted
by uˆ†j(t − 1)) matching the observed action of j at t − 1
(uj(t − 1)), or verbally, what j should have done should
match with what it actually did.
min
c˜i,cˆj
||uˆ†j(t− 1)− uj(t− 1)||22
subject to ξˆ†j (t− 1) = arg max
ξj∈Ξj
p(ξj ; c˜i, cˆj , t− 1)
(4)
We use a finite intent set C for both agents to represent differ-
ent levels of aggressiveness in driving. Since both C and Ξi,j
are finite, the inference is done through an enumeration over
the solution space C × C. The outcome of the enumeration
is a set S(t) = {(c˜∗i , cˆ∗j )k}Kk=1, where each element is a
global solution to Eq. (4). To quantify the uncertainty in
inference and later incorporate it into motion planning, we
assign equal probability mass (1/K) to each solution, based
on which we can compute the empirical joint distribution
p(c˜i, cˆj ; t) and the marginals p(c˜i; t) and p(cˆj ; t), by counting
the appearances of all elements of C in S(t). From the joint
distribution p(c˜i, cˆj ; t), we can infer j’s planned motion.
From each (c˜∗i , cˆ
∗
j ) ∈ S(t) we can compute a conditional
distribution of j’s motion starting from t − 1, denoted by
p(ξˆj ; c˜
∗, cˆ∗j , t − 1), through Q(c˜∗i , cˆ∗j , t − 1). We can then
calculate the marginal p(ξˆj ; t − 1) using p(ξˆj ; c˜∗, cˆ∗j , t − 1)
and p(c˜i, cˆj ; t − 1). Note that this is the distribution of j’s
motion at t−1 rather than t since we formulated the game at
t−1. Although one can formulate a new game at t to derive
p(ξj ; t), in this paper we will approximate p(ξj ; t) using
p(ξj ; t−1). Similarly, we can also infer i’s planned motion as
expected by j, denoted by p(ξ˜i; t). We shall emphasize that
p(ξ˜i; t) is not the distribution of motion that i will follow,
rather, it represents i’s awareness of what j expects it to do.
D. Leveraging past observations
Note that if we consider cj to be time invariant during the
interaction, then all previous observations can be leveraged
to infer cj , leading to a modified problem:
min
{c˜i(τ)}t−1τ=1,cˆj
t−1∑
τ=1
||uˆ†j(τ)− uj(τ)||22
subject to ξ†j (τ) = arg max
ξj∈Ξj
p(ξj ; c˜i(τ), cˆj , τ) ∀τ.
(5)
We allow c˜i to freely change along time since j may change
its mind about i. Solutions to Eq. (5), denoted by S¯(t), can
be found in a recursive way based on solutions to Eq. (4).
Consider an intent candidate cˆj that exists in both S¯(t− 1)
and S(t). Let solutions in S¯(t − 1) that contain cˆj be in
the form of (a, cˆj), where a = [a1, · · · , at−1] ∈ A ⊂ Ct−1
is an array of intents of i. Similarly, let solutions in S(t)
that contain cˆj be in the form of (b, cˆj), where b ∈ B is an
intent of i. Also denote the operation of appending element
b to the array a as [a, b]. Then ([a, b], cˆj) for all a ∈ A and
b ∈ B is a solution to Eq. (5) at t. Following this property,
we have p¯(cˆj ; t) ∝ p¯(cˆj ; t−1)p(cˆj ; t). The update of p¯(cˆj ; t)
will trigger that of the joint probability p(c˜i, cˆj ; t) and the
marginal p(ξˆj ; t). Their updated counterparts are denoted by
p¯(c˜i, cˆj ; t) and p¯(ξˆj ; t), respectively.
IV. MOTION PLANNING
We introduce three planning strategies that incorporate the
inferred intents and motions. Note that in this paper, agents
are only modeled to infer others’ intents rather than their
planning strategies, i.e., they are assumed to use the baseline
strategy but may in fact use different ones (see Fig. 2).
Potential formulations of higher-level inference algorithms
will be discussed in Sec. VI.
A. Reactive motion
Given the distribution of j’s future motions p¯(ξˆj ; t), a
reactive agent plans its motion by minimizing the expected
loss within a time window:
min
ξi∈Ξi,gi(ξi)≤0
Ep¯(ξˆj ;t)f(ξi, ξˆj , ci)
B. Proactive motion
A proactive agent i plans by taking into consideration the
dependency of j’s planning on i’s next action. Specifically, i
calculates the conditional distribution p¯(ξˆj ; ξi, t) based on ξi
and p¯(cˆj ; t), assuming that j will quickly respond to ξi. To do
so, i first finds the set of optimal motions of j for every cˆj ∈
C given ξi. This set is denoted by Qj(ξi) = ∪cˆj∈CQj(ξi, cˆj)
where Qj(ξi, cˆj) = {ξˆ∗j ; ξˆ∗j = arg minξj∈Ξj f(ξj , ξi, cˆj)}.
Then for each element ξˆ∗j ∈ Qj(ξi), we can compute
p¯(ξˆ∗j ; ξi, t) =
∑
cˆj∈C
p¯(cˆj ; t)1(ξˆ
∗
j ∈ Qj(ξi, cˆj))
|Qj(ξi, cˆj)| ,
where 1(·) is an indicator function. For ξˆj ∈ Ξj/Qj(ξi),
we set p¯(ξˆj ; ξi, t) = 0. We can now develop the planning
problem for a proactive agent:
min
ξi∈Ξi,gi(ξi)≤0
Ep¯(ξˆj ;ξi,t)f(ξi, ξˆj , ci)
C. Socially-aware motion
To develop the planning problem for a socially-aware
agent i, we will first find the set of motions {ξji } ⊂ Ξi that
are wanted by j at time t. By definition, ξji belongs to motion
tuples (ξi, ξj) ∈ Q(c˜i, cˆj , t) that minimizes f(ξj , ξi, cˆj).
This set is denoted by Qj(c˜i, cˆj , t). Based on Qj(c˜i, cˆj , t)
and p¯(c˜i, cˆj ; t), we can calculate the conditional probability
p(ξji ; c˜i, cˆj , t) and the marginal p¯(ξ
j
i ; t). A socially-aware
agent solves the following problem where the difference
between i’s planned motion and the wanted motion from
j is added to the proactive loss:
min
ξi∈Ξi,gi(ξi)≤0
Ep(ξˆj ;ξi,t)
(
f(ξi, ξˆj , ci) + βEp¯(ξji ;t)||ξ
j
i − ξi||22
)
The weight β ≥ 0 tunes the importance of social awareness
in the objective: A large β will make i follow what it believes
that j wants it to do, while a small β will convert i to a
proactive agent.
V. SIMULATION CASES AND ANALYSES
In this section we will empirically answer two questions:
(1) How do planning strategies influence interaction dynam-
ics, and (2) why empathy is important for intent inference?
We base all experiments on a simulated intersection case
introduced as follows.
A. Simulation setup
The intersection case is summarized in Fig. 1, where M
moves up (along y-axis) and H moves left (along x-axis).
Motion representation: With minor abuse of notation, we
define ξi as a scalar that determines the distance covered
by an agent in T = 100 steps, and assume that each
agent moves at a uniform speed and a predefined direction:
uM = (0.0, ξM/T ) and uH = (−ξH/T, 0.0). The candidate
motion set is Ξi = Ξj = {−1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0},
where −1.0 means backing up. Initial conditions: M and
H are initially located at sM (0) = (0.0,−2.0) and sH(0) =
(2.0, 0.0). The initial motions are set to ξM (0) = ξH(0) =
5.0. Losses: ltask penalizes the agent if it fails to move across
the intersection within T steps. Taking M as an example,
the loss is defined as lM,task = exp(−s(x)M (t+ T − 1) + 0.4),
where s(x)M is the state of M in the x direction. The safety
loss is defined as lsafety = exp(a(−D2 + b)), where D =
||sM − sH ||22 when both cars are in the interaction area Ω
as shown in Fig. 1, and otherwise D = ∞; a = 5.0 so
that the safety penalty increases significantly as the two cars
approach each other; b = 1.5w2 where w = 1.33 is the
length of the car. This setting creates a safe zone for an
agent since the penalty diminishes when D2 > b. For the
socially-graceful agent, β is set to 0.1 for the following
experiments. A parametric study on β will be discussed
later in this section. Performance metrics: We measure the
performance of a pair of motion planning strategies, denoted
by Pi ∈ {reactive, proactive, social} for i ∈ {M,H},
using two metrics, namely, social gracefulness and social
efficiency. Gracefulness, denoted by qgrace, is defined as
qgrace =
Ts∑
t=0
Ep(ξ?M ;t)||uPMM (t)− u?M ||22,
where Ts is the time horizon for the entire simulation,
uPMM (t) is the action taken by M at t using strategy PM ,
and u?M is the action that H actually wants M to perform,
which can be different from what M believes that H wants
it to perform. We only measure gracefulness of M (the AV).
Social efficiency, denoted by qeff, is defined as the time
required for the agents to reach an agreement. An agreement
is reached at time t when what j expects i to do matches with
what i actually does, i.e., p(ξ˜i = ξi(t); t) = 1. Therefore we
can define
qeff = arg min
t={0,··· ,Ts},p(ξ˜i=ξi(t);t)=1,i∈{M,H}
t.
Experiment setup: The experiments will enumerate over
Pi × Pj ∈ {reactive, proactive, social}2 and cM × cH ∈
{1, 109}2. ci = 1 represents a non-aggressive agent that will
try to avoid being in Ω with the other agent; ci = 109 an
extremely aggressive agent that is willing to collide with the
other agent. To test whether an agent can handle unexpected
intents, the candidate intent set for decoding is set to C =
{1, 103}. ci = 103 represents an aggressive agent that avoids
collision. Conflict in inference: It is worth mentioning
that since the agents do not follow the baseline algorithm
for choosing a motion, their motions do not necessarily
belong to an equilibrium set. This causes occasions where
the probability mass of the true intent of j becomes zero as
inferred by i, or where the updated probability distribution,
e.g., p¯(cˆj ; t), has all zero entries when all candidate intents
have been eliminated during the inference process. In the
implementation, we set p¯(cˆj ; t) back to a uniform distribution
when the latter happens.
B. Influence of planning strategy on the interaction
We use Table I to summarize gracefulness and efficiency
under all combinations of planning strategies and intent
settings. Due to page limit, we highlight two key findings.
(1) The socially-aware strategy balances efficiency and
TABLE I
qGRACE AND qEFF (cH = 1, cH = 109), LOWER VALUES ARE BETTER)
qgrace × 10−3
reactive H proactive H social H
reactive M (∞, 0.0) (0.0, 0.0) (35.5, 0.0)
proactive M (58.3, 35.1) (∞, 35.1) (50.3, 35.1)
social M (31.2, 12.5) (12.5, 12.5) (∞, 12.5)
qeff
reactive M (∞, 1) (1, 1) (44, 1)
proactive M (1, 22) (∞, 22) (24, 22)
social M (44, 24) (24, 24) (∞, 24)
TABLE II
PARAMETRIC STUDY ON THE GRACEFULNESS WEIGHT β
β 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.70
qgrace × 10−3 39.4 31.2 14.8 11.2 5.0 2.2
qeff 43 44 45 49 57 20
right-of-way M M H H H H
gracefulness, provided that human drivers are reactive [4]
and non-aggressive (cH = 1). In particular, a socially-aware
M takes advantage of a non-aggressive agent, and thus it
makes the interaction more efficient than a reactive agent
(which leads to a stagnation as seen in Fig. 3a), while at the
same time in a more graceful way than a proactive agent
(comparison between Fig. 3b and c). (2) In comparison with
proactive planning, the socially-aware M avoids “panic
reactions” when facing unexpectedly aggressive H during
an interaction. As seen in Fig. 3d, a proactive M realizes
that it needs to back off after it enters the interaction
zone, forcing itself to make large change in its motion. In
comparison, a socially-aware M avoids this as it has been
partially complying to H’s intent all along the way, thus
creating a smoother negotiation with H, see Fig. 3e.
C. Parametric study on β
We performed a parametric study on the gracefulness
weight β to examine its influence on the gracefulness and
efficiency of the interaction. Results are summarized in
Table II. In all cases, H is reactive and non-aggressive. As
β increases, M improves its gracefulness by taking actions
closer to what is wanted by H. The efficiency, however,
becomes worse towards β = 0.5 as the interaction becomes
similar to that of reaction vs. reaction. Verbally, being
graceful but not enough graceful will cause confusion in
interactions. As β further increases, M converges to follow a
motion that is in favor of H, and thus improves the efficiency.
D. The importance of empathy in intent inference
We now investigate the importance of empathy in intent
inference using a similar experimental setting as above. We
show that if agent i is modeled to believe that agent j already
knows its true intent, then i will create false estimation of j’s
intent. Experiment setup: In the same intersection scenario,
we use a reactive M vs. a reactive H setting with cM = 1
and cH = 103. In the non-empathetic case, we fix c˜M = 1
for M’s inference processes, and keep H as an empathetic
agent. Analysis: Fig. 4 summarizes the differences between
the non-empathetic and empathetic cases. In the physical
space, we observe that M in the non-empathetic case iterates
between a high and a low speed, similar to the reactive vs.
reactive case with cM = cH = 1, until t = 37 when M
realizes that H might be more aggressive than it thought,
and starts to back off. In the empathetic case, this abrupt
Fig. 3. Snapshots of the interactions. (a) Reactive M vs. reactive H, cM =
cH = 1. Both agents take the same actions at every time step since they
share the same settings. After the initial action at t = 0, both take the
smallest step ξ = 1 at t = 1 due to the concern that the other agent will
take ξ = 5. This iteration between two action values continues indefinitely.
This deadlock can be broken when the agents have significantly different
cs. (b) Proactive M vs. reactive H, cM = cH = 1. M successfully tricks
H into believing that M is aggressive, and forces H to yield. (c) Graceful
M vs. reactive H, cM = cH = 1. M reaches the interaction zone slightly
before H, gently forcing H to yield. (d) Proactive M vs. reactive H, cM = 1,
cH = 10
9. M reaches the interaction zone and realizes that it has to back
off. (e) Graceful M vs. reactive H, cM = 1, cH = 109. M reaches the
interaction zone after H due to its tendency to improve gracefulness, and
therefore avoids sudden change in action. Legend follows Fig. 1.
Fig. 4. (a) Interactions for the empathetic and non-empathetic cases. (b) Intent inference (cˆH by M and cˆM by H) along time.
TABLE III
EQUILIBRIUM SETS AT t = 18, REACTIVE M AND H, cM = 1, cH = 103
cM cH ξM ξH
1 1 ξM = 0 ξH = 0
1 103 ξM = 0 ξH = 5
103 1 ξM = 5 ξH = 0
103 103 ξM = 1 ξH = 1
action change does not happen. Instead, M realizes the
aggressiveness of H earlier, and chooses to stop before it
enters the interaction zone.
This difference in the physical space is caused by that of
the intent inference, see Fig. 4b. We will focus the discussion
at t = 17 where the two cases starts to depart from each
other. At this time step, H takes ξH = 1 and M chooses
to stop for both cases. The equilibrium sets for all intent
combinations are summarized in Table III. In the empathetic
case, based on Eq. (4), we have p(c˜M = 103, cˆH = 103, t =
18) = 1 since this is the only combination that explains
ξH = 1. This leads to p(cˆH = 103, t = 18) = 1. For the
non-empathetic case, since M believes that H knows about
its non-aggressiveness, we have p(c˜M = 1, cˆH = 1, t =
18) = 1. This is because with c˜M = 1, the only equilibrial
motions of H are ξH = 0 and ξH = 5, between which the
former is closer to the observation. This misinterpretation
led to p(cˆH = 1, t = 18) = 1, and M’s more advantageous
motion in the following steps. The above analysis showed
that by fixing c˜M , the agent excludes plausible explanations
of others’ behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigated an empathetic intent inference
algorithm for a non-collaborative interaction between two
agents, and evaluated motion planning formulations that are
enriched by the inference, with respect to social gracefulness
and efficiency.
We now discuss limitations of the presented study and
propose future directions.
a) The inconsistency between intent decoding and mo-
tion planning: One may notice that during motion planning,
i incorporates the uncertainty of the inference of j’s future
motion. However, in intent decoding, i assumes that j uses
a one-hot estimation of i’s intent (c˜M ) in its planning. To
fix this inconsistency, i would need to model j to have
considered a distribution of intents of i in j’s planning,
leading to an inference of the distribution of the distribution
(of c˜i) by i.
b) Provable necessity and sufficiency of empathy:
We demonstrated in Sec. V a case where non-empathetic
inference leads to false estimation of others’ intent. However,
we have not yet investigated the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which empathy will be necessary for the
inference to achieve correct convergence. Or mathematically,
what are the necessary and sufficient conditions to have
p(c˜i = ci, cˆj = cj ; t) = 0 and p(c˜i = c′i, cˆj = cj ; t) > 0
for some c′i 6= ci?
c) Inference of planning strategy: The above discussion
suggests that due to the variation of planning strategies,
intent inference at a parametric level may not be effective
when one has a wrong guess of the others’ strategy. The
question is then how the inference of strategies can be
incorporated, for example to differentiate a proactive agent
that pretends to be aggressive and an aggressive agent. In the
discrete setting as presented in this paper, the inference can
be done by enumerating over all candidate strategies. This,
however, will not elegantly accommodate the estimation of
hyper-parameters such as β. Another potential approach is
to introduce a meta-objective as a weighted sum of loss
functions collected from all strategies, and to infer the
strategy by estimating the weights of this meta-objective, in
addition to the intent parameters.
d) Computational challenges: Last but not least, ex-
tending the proposed decoding and planning algorithms to
continuous domains will be necessary for their scalability in
multi-vehicle coordination scenarios. However, doing so will
introduce computational challenges due to the non-convexity
of the inference and planning problems. In addition, the
incorporation of a high-dimensional distribution of inferred
motions in motion planning can be intractable. We expect
scenario-specific solutions to these challenges.
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